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Home > School of Law > Student > Law Review > Vol. 46 > Iss. 2 (2024)

 

Western New England Law Review

Abstract

In the complicated and technical world of federal drug policy, courts are presented with an ambiguity that requires the court to decide: should a technical definition from other legislation in the area be applied, or should it instead be the dictionary definition supplied by Merriam-Webster? The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Thomas, was faced with this exact dilemma. However, the real-world context of the issue involved a real criminal defendant who received a sentence enhancement because he sold rocks and sand, which he passed off as heroin. The majority, relying on a number of other circuit court cases, adopted the dictionary definition of the term “counterfeit substance,” imposing a harsher sentence on the defendant, despite the fact that the definition proposed by the defendant was an established legislative definition found within the Controlled Substances Act. This Note will address the ambiguity in §4B1.2(b) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, as well as potential solutions to narrow the scope of offenders punished under it. This Note will argue that a plain meaning definition does not encompass the intent of the framers of § 4B1.2(b) when including the term of art “counterfeit substance.” This type of crime requires a nuanced and narrow definition consistent with what Congress and several state legislatures have adopted in their drug policies. This Note will present an amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines consistent with the definition in the Controlled Substances Act that would ensure defendants like Thomas will not receive an enhanced sentence without dealing a controlled substance. The amendment will further the Commission’s goals of providing certainty in sentencing while also creating a uniform federal drug policy.

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