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This Article discusses the supplemental-jurisdiction statute of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which has generated more commentary than perhaps any other jurisdictional section. Together, § 1331, which traces its history to the Judiciary Act of 1875, and § 1332, which dates back to the Judiciary Act of 1789, did not undoubtedly promote more examination in their first eight years of existence. One might speculate why § 1367 has been the focus of so much commentary, largely critical: critical of the speed with which § 1367 was enacted, critical of the narrow range of persons involved in its drafting, critical of its scope, and critical of particular subsections, such as § 1367(b), which limits the use of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity and alienage controversies. While the scholarly literature has served the useful purpose of targeting areas of the statute that may need to be reconsidered, it has, to some degree, obscured the many benefits the statute has wrought. This Comment has three goals: (1) to examine the benefits achieved through the enactment of § 1367, (2) to explore the genuine policy issues that underlie the critical commentary, and (3) to suggest, in general terms, subsections that might benefit from amendment.


Copyright 1998 by the Trustees of Indiana University. Reprinted with permission.

Recommended Citation

74 Ind. L. J. 223 (1998)