The Minds Behind the Movement: The Role of Academics in East Asia’s War Reparations Litigation

Timothy Webster

Recommended Citation

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/facschol

Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of Law.
The Minds Behind the Movement: The Role of Academics in East Asia’s War Reparations Litigation

Timothy Webster*

Table of Contents

I. Introduction ...............................................................................1

II. Japanese Academics ....................................................................5
   A. Miyazaki Shigeki 宮崎繁樹 (Japan) (1925 2016) ....................................5
   B. Tanaka Hiroshi 田中宏 (Japan) (1937 Present) ................................7
   C. Utsumi Aiko 内海愛子 (Japan) (1941 Present) ................................10
   D. Yoshimi Yoshiaki 吉見義明 (Japan) (1946 Present) .....................12
   E. Onuma Yasuaki 大沼保昭 (Japan) (1946 2018) ..........................16

III. Foreign (Non-Japanese) Academics..........................................18
   A. Frits Kalshoven (Netherlands) (1924 2017) ....................................18
   B. Ông Iók-Tek 王育德 (Taiwan) (1924 1985) ....................................20
   C. Yun Chung-ok 尹貞玉, 윤정옥 (Korea) (1925 Present) ...............22
   D. Tong Zeng (China) 童增 (1956 Present) .......................................23
   E. Guan Jianqiang 管建强 (China) (1956 Present) ............................27

IV. Conclusion ................................................................................28

I. Introduction

Japan divides its modern history into two periods: the postwar (1945 present) and the prewar (1868 1945).† In the conventional account, the end of World War II (and termination of the 1952 U.S.

---

* Professor of Law, Western New England University; Adjunct Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.

occupation of Japan)\textsuperscript{2} marks Japan’s entrée into world politics as a liberal democracy. But the war itself continues to generate bitter controversy in East Asia. Within Japan, conservative circles deny or downplay Japanese aggression; they describe Japan’s invasion of East and Southeast Asia as wars of liberation from Western imperialism, call mass atrocities such as the Rape of Nanking a “fabrication,” and accuse “comfort women” of avarice and mendacity.\textsuperscript{3} Progressive Japanese, by contrast, call attention to the various war crimes Japan committed, from the use of chemical weapons against Chinese civilians, to the enslavement of Chinese men and prisoners of war (“POWs”).\textsuperscript{4}

Regionally, Japan and South Korea are locked in a diplomatic struggle due to a series of recent verdicts where Korean courts ordered Japanese multinationals to compensate wartime forced laborers.\textsuperscript{5} China also uses the war to inculcate anti-Japanese sentiment in its increasingly nationalistic populace, providing a social safety valve by which Chinese citizens may blow off steam.\textsuperscript{6}

For the entire postwar period, Japanese courts have adjudicated issues of legal liability for the war. In the 1950s, survivors of the atomic bomb sued Japan.\textsuperscript{7} In the 1960s, Japanese citizens sought repayment for assets seized by foreign countries.\textsuperscript{8} In the 1970s, war reparations litigation internationalized: Korean survivors of the atomic bombing demanded access to medical services that Japan provided to its

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{4} Tsutsui, supra note 3, at 1399 1404.
\bibitem{8} Timothy Webster, \textit{The Long Tail of World War II, in JUST PEACE AFTER CONFLICT} (Carsten Stahn & Jens Iverson eds., 2020).
\end{thebibliography}
citizenry; Taiwanese veterans requested pensions and medical services that veterans with Japanese citizenship received; ethnic Koreans stranded on Sakhalin Island, which Japan retroceded to the Soviet Union after the war, sought repatriation to their home country. And, in the 1990s, after the revelation of the comfort women and forced labor issues, hundreds of plaintiffs mainly from China and South Korea stepped forward to file their complaints.

Behind the scenes, a complex array of scholars, lawyers, and activists laid the groundwork for these cases. In the 1970s and 1980s, groups with names such as the “Consideration Committee” formed to spearhead a particular lawsuit or advocate for a particular cause. These committees comprised a small number of people (at most, a dozen) to conduct research, communicate with potential plaintiffs, attract media coverage, demonstrate, and disseminate information through newsletters. In the 1990s, trial support groups, whose members might number in the hundreds or even thousands, sprang up to provide moral, financial and logistical backing.

It is probably more accurate to speak of these support groups as epistemic communities, consisting of attorneys, academics and activists. But given the present focus on academics, this Article profiles only people with academic affiliations. Most are, or during their lifetimes were, full-time academics. The exception is Tong Zeng, who

11. Id. at 8.
14. See id.
15. Id.
briefly held a lectureship at a university in Beijing in 1990.\textsuperscript{17} He remains, even now, the most influential war reparations activist in China.\textsuperscript{18} The others are not necessarily the most influential academics in East Asia’s war reparations movement. Instead, I have prioritized representativeness by including people from five different countries. Since most war reparations actors (lawyers, academics, activists, etc.) are Japanese, half of the profiles (five of ten) are of Japanese academics.

At the same time, I wish to stress that this is a regional and transnational movement, and therefore include scholars from China, South Korea, and Taiwan. I ensure a modest degree of gender representation by including two women: Utsumi Aiko and Yun Chung-ok. Finally, and perhaps most controversially, I include one Westerner, Professor Frits Kalshoven. His selection reflects various concerns: first, war reparations is also a “Western issue;”\textsuperscript{19} second, some plaintiffs who filed in Japan were actually Western (Dutch, American, British, Australian, etc.);\textsuperscript{20} third, Kalshoven was a leading scholar of international humanitarian law (“IHL”);\textsuperscript{21} and his theory of individual reparations for violations of IHL is a key legal plank of the war reparations movement.\textsuperscript{22}

---

\textsuperscript{17} Tong was appointed a temporary lecturer at the Beijing Chemical Management Cadre College in April, 1990. According to Chinese sources, he “resigned” his position later that year to pursue war reparations activism on a full-time basis. See Zhang Lei, Zhongguo Minjian Duiri Suopei Yundong Faqiren: Yao Wei Shouhaizhe Taohui Gongdao [Initiator of Chinese Citizens’ Movement for Compensation from Japan: Seeking Justice for the Victims], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINA YOUTH NEWS] (July 5, 2018), http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2018-07-05/doc-ihevauxk6872197.shtml [https://perma.cc/SL92-DUNH].


\textsuperscript{20} Id. at 857, n.91.


\textsuperscript{22} Kalshoven, \textit{supra} note 19, at 829.
II. JAPANESE ACADEMICS

A. Miyazaki Shigeki 宮崎繁樹 (Japan) (1925-2016)

Alongside Professor Ông Iók-tek (profiled below), Professor Miyazaki was a fountainhead of East Asia’s war reparations movement. His interests in human rights, comparative law, and international law cultivated through hundreds of academic articles blossomed into a legal and political campaign to compensate Taiwanese veterans.23 Miyazaki helped engineer a lawsuit that focused attention on Japan’s failure to compensate its war veterans, traditionally among Japan’s most handsomely compensated pensioners.24 This was not the first transnational war reparations lawsuit, but it was among the first to unite activists from both Japan and Taiwan—a key feature of the current transnational legal activism (1990 present).25 Miyazaki also paved the way for Japan’s Diet to pass the Taiwan Veterans Act of 1987, the rare exception to the “rule of nationality”26 that has governed the provision of wartime social benefits in contemporary Japan.

In February 1975, Miyazaki co-founded the Committee to Consider the Compensation Issue for Taiwanese Veterans.27 Initially, Committee


26. *Id.*

27. In Japanese, 台湾人元日本兵士の補償問題を考える会. Miyazaki was also the chief scribe of the Taiwan veterans movement. He edited all twenty-two editions of the group’s newsletter, 台湾人元日本兵士の補償問題を考える [Considering Taiwanese Veterans], published between 1977 and 1992. He later compiled the newsletters, contemporaneous media accounts, court documents, and other relevant materials into a 1,000-page compendium, entitled 台湾・補償・痛恨 : 台湾人元日本兵戦死傷補償問題資料集成冊 [TAIWAN, COMPENSATION, GRIEF: A COMPENDIUM OF MATERIALS ON THE COMPENSATION ISSUE OF FORMER JAPANESE SOLDIERS FROM TAIWAN] (1993) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM]. As part of this scholarly venture, Professor Miyazaki penned a short introduction to the movement. See generally Miyazaki Shigeki (宮崎繁樹), ‘台湾人元日本兵士の補償問題を考える会’結成の経緯とその運動の展開 [The Committee to Consider the Compensation Issue for Former Taiwanese Soldiers in the Japanese Army: The History of Its Formation and Development of the Movement], in COMPENDIUM 64-70 [hereinafter Miyazaki Background].
members planned to lobby the Japanese Diet to pass compensatory legislation.\textsuperscript{28} Once they realized that a compensation law was unlikely in the near term, Miyazaki and company filed a lawsuit instead.\textsuperscript{29} Looking back, East Asia’s transnational war reparations cause was born, as a matter of law.\textsuperscript{30}

After liaising with activists in Taiwan on war compensation issues, Miyazaki gained the support and legal services of attorneys from the Japan Civil Liberties Union.\textsuperscript{31} On August 13, 1977, Taiwanese veteran Deng Sheng filed a compensation lawsuit in the Tokyo District Court.\textsuperscript{32} Alongside thirteen other Taiwanese soldiers and civilians, Deng sued Japan to access benefits that Japan provided to its own wounded veterans.\textsuperscript{33} When Japan denationalized its former colonial subjects in 1952, Taiwanese (and Korean) soldiers were cut off from the financial and medical benefits promised to them as soldiers.\textsuperscript{34} The irony was particularly bitter for Taiwanese soldiers, who found themselves ruled by the Nationalist Party known as Kuomintang (“KMT”), against whom they had fought as “Japanese” soldiers in the war.\textsuperscript{35}

Miyazaki’s Committee mattered for many reasons. First, the use of strategic litigation to pursue a cause resounds across many areas of Japanese public law.\textsuperscript{36} For seventeen years, the Committee raised money to cover court costs; without its support, there would be no lawsuit. Second, the Committee’s newsletters collected valuable information about the movement: developments in Taiwan,

\begin{enumerate}
\item Miyazaki Background, supra note 27, at 68.
\item See Questionnaire on Compensation Issues for Former Taiwanese Soldiers, supra note 28.
\item Miyazaki Background, supra note 27, at 68.
\item A Long, Long Way to Go, supra note 32.
\item Id.
\item Miyazaki Background, supra note 27, at 68.
\end{enumerate}
communications with Taiwanese civil society groups, protests and other activities in which Committee members engaged, and hearings from the trial itself. 37 Third, Committee members one of whom was elected to the Japanese Diet sought help and assistance from Japanese politicians. 38 They were essential in passing compensatory legislation; the 1987 Taiwan Veterans Act has been credited with motivating other Asian victims of the war to inquire about war reparations, and launch lawsuits in many cases. 39

Miyazaki not only researched the underlying issues, he also showed the importance of civil society engagement. In the “contemporary” war reparations movement, from roughly 1990 to the present, the importance of domestic activism and transnational linkages cannot be overlooked. 40 Decades ago, Miyazaki grasped the symbolic function of litigation its abilities to capture media attention, to frame the underlying issue, and to speak to new audiences and the need to form civil society groups to sustain activism.

B. Tanaka Hiroshi 田中宏 (Japan) (1937 Present)

Professor Tanaka is among the most prolific and activist scholars working in the war reparations field. While training in Chinese studies as an undergraduate, Tanaka heard about Liu Lianren, a Chinese man who escaped from the Japanese mine where he had been sent to perform forced labor, and lived as a fugitive in the wilds of Hokkaido for the next twelve years. 41 A Japanese hunter found Liu in 1958, and surrendered him to local police. 42 This was the first time that Tanaka had heard about Japan’s widespread use of Chinese forced labor, a topic about which he would later extensively write. Tanaka also been intimately involved with movements involving resident Koreans in Japan: employment discrimination, pension eligibility, fingerprinting,

37. Webster, supra note 25, at 328.
39. Webster, supra note 25, at 331.
40. Id. at 308 09.
42. For the story of Liu’s background, and his epochal lawsuit against the Japanese government in the 1990s, see Timothy Webster, Sisyphus in a Coalmine: Responses to Slave Labor in Japan and the United States, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 734, 750 51 (2006).
and political rights (the right to vote and the right to hold political office).\textsuperscript{43}

Tanaka along with Professors Onuma Yasuaki and Utsumi Aiko took an important step in organizing the war reparations movement by forming the “Committee to Consider War Responsibility towards Asia” in 1983.\textsuperscript{44} This group aimed to popularize the notion that Japan, even decades after the end of World War II, still bore legal and moral responsibilities towards other Asian peoples. Their most pressing concern was the repatriation of ethnic Koreans whom Japan had left behind on Sakhalin Island.\textsuperscript{45} In 1975, some 43,000 Koreans were still displaced on Sakhalin as prisoners of Cold War politics, Japan’s incomplete decolonization, and a corrupt autocracy in South Korea.\textsuperscript{46}

Tanaka’s next foray into the war reparations came in 1986, when lawyer Niimi Tadashi requested his help in locating materials on Chinese forced labor, and the Hanaoka Incident in particular.\textsuperscript{47} During World War II, Japan mobilized nearly 40,000 men from mainland China against their will, and sent them to perform forced labor in abject conditions throughout Japan.\textsuperscript{48} On June 30, 1945, a group of Chinese


\textsuperscript{44} \textit{See} 日本平和学会 [Peace Studies Association of Japan], 第6回日本平和学会 平和賞: 内海愛子、大沼保昭、田中宏 [Sixth Peace Prize Winners: Utsumi Aiko, Onuma Yasuaki, Tanaka Hiroshi], MINDAN NEWS (Mar. 17, 2017), psaj.org/award06? [https://perma.cc/5HJD-XG2C].

\textsuperscript{45} Japan took the southern half of Sakhalin Island upon defeating Russia in 1905. In 1945, Japan retroceded the island to the Soviet Union. \textit{See} Soo Son, supra note 10, at 8.


forced laborers rioted against the Kajima company, a failed insurrection known as the “Hanaoka Incident” after the city where the mine was located.  

Professor Tanaka scoured archives in the United States and Japan to track down information on the forced labor program, an issue that remained obscure within Japan. He interviewed Japanese officials who conducted surveys of Japan’s wartime forced labor program immediately after the war, and contacted Chinese forced laborers who survived the insurrection, including its leader, Geng Zhun. In 1988, Tanaka formed the Committee to Consider Chinese Forced Labor, one of many grassroots organizations dedicated to war reparations. Committee members, including Tanaka, visited China several times to conduct research, to meet experts and survivors, and to represent Chinese forced laborers in a settlement agreement with Kajima. When negotiations broke down, Geng Zhun sued Kajima in 1995, the first of hundreds of Chinese forced laborers to do so. Tanaka would testify on behalf of Geng during his appeal to the Tokyo High Court in 1999.

---

49. For background on the Hanaoka Incident, as well as the settlement process between the Chinese forced laborers and Kajima Construction Company, see Webster, supra note 25, at 348-49.

50. ZHENG, supra note 47, at 191.

51. Id. at 192.


55. Tanaka submitted testimony on the issue of contractual relations between Chinese forced laborers and the Japanese companies that “employed” them. The trial court had dismissed Geng’s case on the rather technical defense that, because Geng never signed a contract with Kajima, he lacked a contractual relationship with the company for the purpose of establishing legal liability. Geng, 988 HANREI TAIMUZU at 253. Tanaka argued that the contract that Japanese companies had signed with the North China Labor
C. Utsumi Aiko 内海愛子 (Japan) (1941 Present)

Professor Utsumi has devoted much of her academic career to World War II, most notably the problems faced by Korean veterans of the Japanese Imperial Army. After earning a B.A. in English literature, M.A. in philosophy, and Ph.D. in sociology from Waseda University, she taught Japanese language at Padjadjaran University in Indonesia from 1975 to 1977, one of few Japanese academics to have lived in a country Japan invaded. Her experiences in Indonesia led her to research the issue of Korean prison guards in Southeast Asian POW camps.

Utsumi’s research figured prominently in the war reparations movement, providing the factual and historical bases of many lawsuits. Her first book explored Korean “BC-level” war criminals: the small and medium fish who committed war crimes but did not order or plan them. After the war, the Allies’ national military tribunals

Association (a government agency of the Japanese colonial state in Manchuria) sufficed to fulfill the necessary contractual relationship. See Naitō Mitsuhiro (内藤光博), 戦後補償裁判における花岡事件訴訟和解の意義 [Significance of the Hanaoka Incident Settlement Within the Postwar Compensation Trials], 459 専修大学社会科学研究所月報 [MONTHLY REPORT OF SENSHU UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE] 57, 63 (2001). For more on contractual relations in the context of the legal liability of Japanese corporations, see Timothy Webster, Disaggregating Corporate Liability: Japanese Multinationals and World War II, 56 STAN. J. INT’L L. 175, 200 (2020).


57. See Utsumi Aiko (内海愛子), 戦争裁判、賠償から考えるアジア太平洋戦争: BC級戦犯を中心に [Thinking About War Trials and Compensation in the Asia Pacific War: Focusing on BC-Level War Criminals], 12 創発 [EMERGENCE] (2007). Utsumi describes seeing a bronze statue of an emaciated boy at a Dutch cemetery in Semarang, and realizing that the guard for the juvenile detention center was Korean. Thus Koreans not just the Japanese were responsible for Japanese war crimes. Id. at 23.


59. See RECORDS OF KOREAN BC-LEVEL WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 58. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East ("IMTFE") tried the "big fish," high-level military officers and government officials responsible
convicted 148 Koreans of low-level war crimes, mostly prison guards for abusing POWs.60 One of the men profiled in Utsumi’s book, a guard named Lee Hak-rae (Yi Hak-nae), was convicted of abusing POWs in a Thai prison camp.61 As a convicted war criminal, a Japanese citizen would earn about $41,000 a year in pensions and benefits.62 But Lee was not a Japanese citizen, as Japan denationalized its Korean population in 1952.63 In 1991, Lee and six other convicted Korean war criminals sued Japan for compensation, including a pension.64 Utsumi was among three experts to testify at the trial.65

In a subsequent lawsuit brought by Korean soldiers,66 Utsumi also testified to the Tokyo High Court.67 Utsumi informed the appellate court of the miserable conditions that many convicted Koreans faced.68 Those who remained in Japan lived marginal existences; homelessness

---

for orchestrating and ordering war crimes. By contrast, the Allied powers held national military tribunals to preside over the small and medium fish, such as prison guards. For example, the United States conducted its national military tribunals in Yokohama, Japan; the Netherlands conducted its national military tribunals in Batavia (present-day Jakarta, Indonesia); and Britain conducted its national military tribunal in Singapore.


61. Id. at 1.


63. Utsumi et al., supra note 60, at 3.


68. Id.
and suicide were not uncommon.\textsuperscript{69} Those who returned to Korea concealed their past, lest they be denounced as “pro-Japanese,” or their children bullied as traitors to the country.\textsuperscript{70} Finally, Utsumi called on the court to take a more active stance in the reparations process, instead of assuming the more deferential posture it has struck in most war reparations lawsuits.\textsuperscript{71}

D.\textit{ Yoshimi Yoshiaki 吉見義明 (Japan) (1946 Present)}

Professor Yoshimi, at present an emeritus historian at Chuo University, has uncovered a wide range of historical evidence about Japanese war crimes. Most famously, he unearthed documents linking the Japanese military to the “comfort women” system, a transnational sex trafficking network that Japan operated throughout the Asia-Pacific from 1932 to 1945.\textsuperscript{72} These documents provided the legal basis for compensation lawsuits against the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{73}

One cannot understand the comfort women issue, and the war reparations movement more broadly, without appreciating the denials, obfuscations, and tergiversations of Japanese government officials. Until 1992, the Japanese government insisted that “comfort stations” (\textit{ianjo}), where Japanese soldiers paid a low sum of money to have sex with women and girls, were “private businesses,” legally distinct from the military.\textsuperscript{74} In 1990, when a Japanese senator from an opposition party urged the government to investigate the comfort women issue, the government refused, calling it a private matter in which the government played no role.\textsuperscript{75} The official denial stoked resistance among Korean activists, supporters, and ultimately survivors of the comfort

\textsuperscript{69.} Id.

\textsuperscript{70.} Id.


\textsuperscript{74.} Onishi, \textit{supra} note 72.

women system. Shortly after the first survivor Kim Hak-sun sued the government on December 6, 1991, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kato Koichi, told reporters, “We have had a hard time finding materials that show the involvement of government institutions. At this moment, it is extremely difficult for the government to deal with this issue.”

One month later, the Asahi Shimbun, Japan’s leading progressive newspaper, published the front-page story, Documents Show Military Involvement in Comfort Stations, describing a cache of files that Yoshimi “discovered” in the Defense Agency.

Yoshimi’s scholarship, in particular his book “Military Comfort Women,” has exerted a powerful influence on contemporary understandings of the comfort women system. Many of his theses have gained broad acceptance among scholars, activists, and judges, including (a) the Japanese government was involved in orchestrating the comfort women system; (b) most comfort women were coerced into the system through deception, force, or false pretenses; (c) Japan’s conduct violated international law, and thus Japan remains legally responsible; and (d) the crimes did not end with the dissolution of the comfort women system, but last for as long as Japan evades responsibility.

76. This included a letter from Korean women’s groups sent a letter to Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki demanding inter alia apologies, compensation, and a full accounting of the government’s involvement. Later, a woman named Kim Hak-sun would publicly admit that she had been a comfort woman, the first of hundreds of women who would then step forward to acknowledge this painful period of their lives. See Onishi, supra note 72; How Did the Comfort Women Issue Come to Light?, ASIAN WOMEN’S FUND, https://www.awf.or.jp/e2/survey.html [https://perma.cc/DL9D-37JV].

77. IKUHIKO HATA, COMFORT WOMEN AND SEX IN THE BATTLE ZONE 17 (Jason Michael Morgan trans. 2018).

78. 慰安所軍関与示す資料 [Documents Show Military Involvement in Comfort Stations], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Jan. 11, 1992.


One way to measure Yoshimi’s influence is to read opinions where he testified. In *Song Shindo v. Japan*, a resident Korean survivor of the comfort women system sued Japan for compensation and an apology. Though Judge Narita Kitarú dismissed the case, as almost all Japanese judges do, he made specific factual findings that reflect Yoshimi’s view. Take this account of the origins of comfort stations:

During the so-called Shanghai Incident of 1932, because of the incidence of rape by the Japanese army, so-called military comfort stations were established for the purposes of prostitution. The stations were set up at the initiative of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, and modeled on the Navy’s comfort stations. Up until that time, the system military comfort stations, military comfort women did not exist. But from that time, until the end of the war, comfort stations were set up in many places, and many comfort women were dispatched there, often for long periods of time.

Yoshimi likewise posits the Japanese Navy initiated the comfort women system after fallout from the Shanghai Incident, and that the Army followed the Navy’s lead. Judge Narita delineated the formative role of the state in running the comfort stations:

Many comfort stations operated as private businesses. But in certain regions, there were instances where the Japanese military directly operated the stations. Even when a private business operated the station, the Japanese military directly participated in establishing and administering the comfort station: the military gave its consent to open the station, to maintain the facilities,

---


82. *Song Shindo v. Japan*, Tôkyô Chihô Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Oct. 1, 1999 (slip op.), justice.skr.jp/judgements/28-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T29M-QBLU]. Resident Koreans are, for the most part, descendants of ethnic Koreans brought to Japan (often forcibly) during Japan’s colonization of Korea (1910–1945). They are not citizens of Japan, and in some cases have become citizens of North Korea or South Korea.

83. *Song v. Japan*, slip op. at 5-6 (translation by author).

84. *Yoshimi, Comfort Women*, supra note 80, at 43 44.
and to establish rules (hours of operation, prices, procedures, etc.).

This passage directly refutes the Japanese government’s long-held characterization of comfort stations as strictly private brothels.

Finally, the judgment focuses on coercion, another point of contention in the broader debate. It describes survivor Song’s induction:

Plaintiff cried and resisted before being admitted to the comfort station, where she was forced to undergo a medical examination by an army medic. After being admitted, she was forced against her will to be the sexual partner of Japanese soldiers as a military comfort woman. When she grew disgusted and tried to flee, comfort station staff caught her and forcibly returned her, kicking and beating her as punishment. She was inevitably forced to partner with soldiers.

While we can certainly question the judge’s word choice and passive voice which I have tried to capture in my English translation Song clearly did not want to be a comfort woman. The issue of coercion is a point of contention among conservative Japanese politicians. Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, most notably, states there is no “documentary evidence” that women were coerced into the system.

This passage, a judicial opinion issued by the Tokyo District Court is one document that proves coercion.

Yoshimi also argued that the comfort women system violated international treaties and customs. For example, Japan ratified the 1910 Prostitution Convention, 1921 Trafficking Convention, and the 1930 Forced Labor Convention. However, as Yoshimi points out, Japan specifically excluded the application of the first two conventions

85. Song v. Japan, slip op. at 7 8 (translation by author).
86. Onishi, supra note 72.
87. Song v. Japan, slip op. at 10 (translation by author).
89. YOSHIMI, COMFORT WOMEN, supra note 80, at 155 63.
in its colonies. This exclusion, wrote Yoshimi, “turned Korea and Taiwan into supply depots for military comfort women.” Nevertheless, Judge Narita found that Japan’s conduct violated various international treaties and customs.

E. Onuma Yasuaki (Japan) (1946–2018)

Professor Onuma Yasuaki was among Japan’s most renowned scholars of international law. Just as World War II has defined modern Japan, scholarship on the war has defined Professor Onuma’s scholarly trajectory. While a student at University of Tokyo in the 1960s, Onuma participated in the Vietnam Anti-War Movement, as well as Zenkyōtō Movement. After graduating, Onuma published *Introduction to a Theory of War Responsibility* in 1975, which traced how the Allied Powers promulgated “crimes against peace” in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials by melding the concepts of command responsibility with illegality of war. Onuma sought to reconstitute Japanese identity by extending discussions of war responsibility toward Asia, and away from the Allied Powers.

One of the first movements in which Onuma participated as a junior academic was the repatriation of Sakhalin Koreans. At the time, this was one of the more glaring examples of war irresponsibility. While many countries contributed to the stalemate, the fact that 43,000 Koreans displaced by Japan in the early twentieth century remained so in the 1970s seemed both anachronistic and willfully cruel. In 1974


94. *Id.*

95. Webster, *supra* note 55, at 216 17.


97. *See generally* ÖNUMA YASUAKI (大沼保昭), 戦争責任論序説 [INTRODUCTION TO A THEORY OF WAR RESPONSIBILITY] (1975). According to Onuma, the crimes against peace also constituted ex post facto law, violating a basic principle of contemporary law.


and 1975, Sakhalin Koreans filed two cases seeking repatriation making them among the first of Japan’s transnational war reparations lawsuits. Onuma actively researched various causes related to war reparations, including Japan’s immigration control laws (with which Resident Koreans had to comply), the legal status of resident Koreans, and the fingerprinting requirement that Japan imposed on resident Koreans. He also lobbied members of Japan’s Diet including Councilor Hara Bunbei and Representative Igarashi Kôzô to take up the reparations issue. In 1999, Onuma was appointed Director (rijji) of the Asian Women’s Fund (“AWF”), an initiative set up by the Japanese government to assist, compensate and apologize to the survivors of the comfort women system. While some have criticized the AWF for its equivocality, Onuma defended the effort as “an attempt for the Japanese nation as a whole, partly the government and partly the citizens, to take responsibility for the wrong which the Japanese nation as a whole had committed.” Though Onuma has not testified in any war reparations lawsuits, at least as far as this author can discern, he has played an active role in the movement through research, publications, and activism.


III. FOREIGN (NON-JAPANESE) ACADEMICS

A. Frits Kalshoven (Netherlands) (1924–2017)

Professor Kalshoven played a limited role in Asia’s war reparation movement. But the argument for which he is most famous—that the individual has a right to demand compensation against the state that violates international humanitarian law resonates in virtually every war reparations lawsuit. To be sure, his reading of the Hague Convention draws heavily on its text, drafting history, and travaux préparatoires. Kalshoven himself characterized subsequent state practice of providing compensation to individual victims as “disappointing.” Nevertheless, the question of individual subjectivity in international law, especially international humanitarian law, remains a hot topic, as manifest in recent decisions by the International Court of Justice, Supreme Court of Greece, and Italian Court of Cassation.

Professor Kalshoven provided expert testimony, both in court and through written submissions, in several war reparations lawsuits. He testified before the Tokyo District Court in the Dutch POW/Comfort Woman case (June 24, 2007), and the Filipina Comfort Women case.


108. Id. at 832–34.

109. Id. at 836.


In both cases, he argued that Japan’s violation of the Hague Convention empowered the individual plaintiffs to sue Japan in domestic courts. Japanese judges dismissed both cases, but tacitly acknowledged part of Kalshoven’s argument. Nonetheless, the courts reinforced the exclusively statist nature of international claims. As the Tokyo District Court framed the issue:

Under international law, a state that violates international legal obligations owes a responsibility to the injured state. Even in cases where the harm to the individual violates a state’s obligations under international law, the damage is regarded as belonging to the state, not the individual. The harmed individual will only get an indirect remedy, when his home state exercises diplomatic protection on his behalf.

Undeterred, Kalshoven wrote a supplementary opinion to correct what he saw as the trial courts’ errors. Addressing the Tokyo High Court in the appeals process, Kalshoven argued that the individual can be the subject of rights under international law. More specifically, this included the right to prosecute such claims in national courts. In the end, the appellate court, and later the Supreme Court, were no more sympathetic to Kalshoven’s theory than the trial court. Still, his participation called attention (particularly from Western media) to the war reparations lawsuits, and pressed the Japanese judiciary to clarify where it stood on the issue of individual subjectivity under international law.

114. In the Dutch case, for example, the court conceded that the individual right to seek compensation arose in the discussions of the Hague Convention, but the Member States did not intend to give individuals the right to seek compensation directly against the State. Lapré, slip. op. at 78.
115. Lapré, slip. op. at 34 (translated by author).
117. Id. at 99.
118. Kalshoven cites the example of “international minimum standard of treatment,” a topic derived from international investment law (“IIL”). IIL permits a “foreigner” to file a case in domestic courts, and if he is dissatisfied with the result, to enlist the support of his home government to invoke diplomatic protection. Id. at 99 100.
B. Ông Iók-Tek 王育德 (Taiwan) (1924–1985)

Taiwan has played a minor, yet foundational, role in East Asia’s war reparations movement. In the 1970s, a group of ethnic Taiwanese living in Japan, as well as Taiwanese citizens living in Taiwan, began to investigate the adequacy of Japan’s war reparations to Taiwan. In 1971, Japan derecognized Taiwan, leading many Taiwanese, in Japan and Taiwan, to question the historical, economic, and political relationships between Taipei and Tokyo. In 1972, Japan unilaterally nullified the 1952 Taipei Treaty, the legal instrument that formally ended the war between Japan and the Republic of China on Taiwan. In the politico-legal opportunity structure thus opened, many Taiwanese stepped forward to demand Japan reinstate the Japanese nationality that they had enjoyed under Japanese colonialism, repay wartime debts such as bonds and military currency, and provide pensions to Taiwanese veterans of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy.

At the center of these trajectories were two members of the faculty of Meiji University: Miyazaki Shigeki (profiled above) and linguistics professor Ông Iók-tek. Born and raised in Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period (1895–1945), Ông fled Taiwan after the KMT set up a government in Taiwan. Ông’s brother had been killed in the notorious February 28 Incident (228 Incident), when the KMT killed an estimated 20,000 anti-government protestors and activists. Henceforth, Professor Ông would never return to Taiwan.

119. Political activism in Taiwan rose precipitously after the KMT party lost power, and reparations from Japan were one category of concern. See Nien-Chung Chang-Liao & Yu-Jie Chen, Transitional Justice in Taiwan: Changes and Challenges, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 619, 628 (2019).


122. Dahl & Togo, supra note 120.

123. This is the Taiwanese, as opposed to the Mandarin Chinese, pronunciation of his name.


125. Estimates of the number of activists and intellectuals murdered range from 18,000 to 28,000. See Chang-Liao & Chen, supra note 119 at 625–26; see also Thomas J. Shattuck, Taiwan’s White Terror: Remembering the 228 Incident, FOREIGN POL’Y RSCH. INST. (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.fpri.org
In the mid-1970s, as a professor of Chinese linguistics and Taiwanese nationalist, Ông grew active in the Taiwan veterans cause. In December 1974, Indonesia repatriated a “Japanese” soldier it had discovered in the jungles. In fact, he was an indigenous Taiwanese man named “Shiniyuwu” in his native tongue (Ami), “Li Guanghui” in Mandarin Chinese, and “Nakamura Teruo” in Japanese.Ôông Shiniyuwu was sent back to Taiwan with none of the pomp or finance that attended the contemporaneous “discovery” of other Japanese soldiers in formerly enemy territory. Many objected to this differential treatment, and formed a grassroots group, the “Committee to Warmly Welcome Mr. Nakamura” in January, 1975. This group conducted small-scale protests in downtown Tokyo, raised funds to help Nakamura, and demanded the Japanese government provide similar benefits to Shiniyuwu/Nakamura as it did to veterans with Japanese citizenship.

This group served as a prototype to another grassroots committee on which Ông played a founding role. In February, 1975, the two Meiji University professors formed a new group to examine the veterans’ compensation issue more deeply. Together with eleven other Japanese academics and professionals, including friends from Ông’s youth in Taiwan, the “Committee to Consider Compensating Taiwanese Veterans” sought to persuade the Japanese government to pay the same benefits, pensions and medical treatment to Taiwanese veterans that it had already paid to veterans with Japanese citizenship since 1952.

The Committee that Ông and Miyazaki founded would support the Taiwan veterans’ lawsuit as it wended its way to Japan’s Supreme
When the Court dismissed the case in 1992, the Committee disbanded. Wang, of course, had died just after the Tokyo High Court also dismissed the case. Before the dismissal, the Committee raised funds to cover court costs, plaintiffs’ travel to hearings and lodging in Japan, as well as associated activities. The Committee also published a newsletter, *Considering Taiwanese Veterans*, which reported on individual hearings, developments in other countries (including Taiwan and the United States), and coverage in domestic and international media. The Consideration Committee thus also served as a “trial support group” (*shienkai*); in the contemporary war reparations movement, numerous such groups, devoted to a single case, have mushroomed throughout the Japanese archipelago.

C. Yun Chung-ok 雲貞玉 (Korea) (1925 Present)

Yun Chung-ok, professor emerita of Ewha Womans University in Seoul, led Korea’s comfort women redress movement from its inception in 1990. Born in colonial Korea to a Christian pastor, Yun grew up in a family that stressed educational achievement, even for girls, which was a notable departure from the prevailing culture at the time. During her last year of high school, Yun was fingerprinted against her will. Rather than continue her education, she withdrew from school to avoid conscription into the women’s “volunteer corps” (*cheong shindae*). Yun escaped a life of difficulty that many of her classmates would endure.

In the 1980s, Yun began to research comfort women, conducting visits to Fukuoka, Sapporo, and Okinawa. Her work came to prominence in 1988, when she presented on the linkages between Korea’s “volunteer corps” and Japan’s “military comfort women” (*jūgunianfu*) at the Cheju “Women and Tourism” conference, sponsored by the non-governmental organization, Korean Church Women


133. *Id.* at 1233.

134. *Id.*

135. *See id.* at 1228.

United.\textsuperscript{137} Yun visited former comfort stations in Thailand and Papua New Guinea in 1989, and published reports on them in January 1990.\textsuperscript{138}

On November 16, 1990, Yun with her Ewha colleague Lee Hyo-chae formed the Korean Council for Women Drafted by Japan for Sexual Slavery.\textsuperscript{139} The Council joined together dozens of women’s organizations, including the KCWU,\textsuperscript{140} to uncover the truth about the comfort women system, and to restore the dignity of survivors. These organizations had already collaborated on conferences, demonstrations, and petitions to the Japanese government. In October 1992, groups sent an open letter to Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi with six demands. One measure of the movement’s success would be to weigh which of these six demands has been met.

Through the Council’s efforts (hotlines, counseling, information sessions), seventy-four survivors of the comfort women system registered with the Korean government.\textsuperscript{141} Many of these women, including Kim Hak-sun, later sued Japan and pioneered the transnational reparations movement.\textsuperscript{142} Within the Council, Yun focused on research and compensation with the Japanese government, while Lee liaised with transnational activists and international organizations.\textsuperscript{143} Yun handled the lawsuits, while Lee lobbied the United Nations.\textsuperscript{144}

\textbf{D. Tong Zeng (China) 童增 (1956 Present)}

Tong is China’s leading war reparations activist. As a graduate student at Peking University Law School in 1990, he read an article about contemporaneous European efforts to seek war reparations from Germany.\textsuperscript{145} After conducting his own research, Tong propounded his

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{137} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{138} \textit{See id.}
\item \textsuperscript{139} \textit{See Soh, supra note 132, at 1232–33.}
\item \textsuperscript{140} Chai, \textit{supra} note 136, at 79. The KCWU was the organization to which Kim Hak-sun made her August 14, 1990 “confession” that she served as a comfort woman, unleashing a wave of support around the issue in Korea and Japan.
\item \textsuperscript{141} \textit{Id.} at 83.
\item \textsuperscript{142} \textit{See generally Lawsuits Brought Against Japan by Former Korean “Comfort Women”, COLUM. L. SCH.: CTR. FOR KOREAN LEGAL STUD., https://kls.law.columbia.edu/content/lawsuits-brought-against-japan-former-korean-comfort-women [https://perma.cc/5GM7-9XHW].}
\item \textsuperscript{143} Soh, \textit{supra} note 132, at 1234
\item \textsuperscript{144} \textit{See id.}
\item \textsuperscript{145} Tong Zeng, \textit{It Is of Great Urgency that China Demand Damage Compensation from Japan} (Mar. 25, 1991) (Graduate thesis, National
own theory of war reparations, distinguishing the *individual* right to seek compensation from Japan, from the Chinese *state’s* right to seek compensation which the PRC waived in the 1972 Joint Communiqué.¹⁴⁶

Later, as a lecturer at a university in Beijing, Tong advocated his theory in a *wanyanshu*,¹⁴⁷ a traditional form of presenting ideas to political leaders.¹⁴⁸ He initially titled his report *Victim Compensation Proposals in Europe: Lessons for China*.¹⁴⁹ He spoke with numerous newspapers and academic journals about publishing his paper, but they rejected his work as too politically sensitive.¹⁵⁰ The idea of an individual right to compensation is not radical in international law; it subtends international investment law, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law; many human rights treaties provide

People’s Congress of China) (Zeng’s research results and proposal to the National People’s Congress). The thesis listed several developments, including a meeting between East German leader Erich Honecker and World Jewish Congress president Edgar Bronfman, Albania’s $2 billion demand for reparations from West Germany, and requests from Finland and Poland. None of the cases involved individual to State discussions, but rather intergovernmental efforts between West and East German leaders, and leaders from other European States.


¹⁴⁷ *See* Alice Miller, *Dilemmas of Globalization and Governance*, in THE POLITICS OF CHINA: SIXTY YEARS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 528, 537 (Roderick MacFarquhar ed., 3d ed. 2011). Wang Anshi presented his reform recommendations in a *wanyanshu* 万言书 to Song Emperor Renzong in 1058. Qing Dynasty reformers such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao likewise expressed their opposition to the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki through a *wanyanshu*. In the 1950s, Peng Dehuai remonstrated with Mao Zedong about the excesses of the Great Leap Forward through a *wanyanshu*, though Peng did not use that term.

¹⁴⁸ *Id.*


¹⁵⁰ Liu Shangjun, *Tong Zeng: Jianchi Le 26-nian Xiangxin Zhengyi Yiding Hui Daolai [Tong Zeng: After Persisting for 26 years, Believes Justice Will Come]*, ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN WANG [CHINA YOUTH NETWORK], June 6, 2016, https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2016/06-06/7895347.shtml [https://perma.cc/5DL3-TYCH]. The author notes that a Shanghai publisher expressed interest, but later rejected Tong’s treatise with three words: *bu gan fa* (“We don’t dare publish it!”).
individual access to remedies for violations of constitutional or international law. Moreover, some scholars interpret international humanitarian law treaties as extending the right to seek compensation to individuals, though state practice of such rights is quite rare. Still, Tong’s ideas found few takers among the publishers in Beijing and Shanghai, perhaps cagey after the political crackdown following the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square. Ultimately, Tong published “China’s Demands for Japanese Reparations Cannot Be Delayed,” in *Legal Daily*, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party, and later in *People’s Daily, Worker’s Daily*, and other state-run media.

But Tong was not merely a scholar. He wanted the government to respond to his proposal. In March 1991, Tong poked around the hotels where delegates of the National People’s Congress (“NPC”) stayed during the annual meeting: Jingxi Hotel, Guoyi Hotel, and Beijing Hotel. “At the time,” Tong explained, “NPC delegates would come out for a walk around 6:30 PM, and head back to watch the news at 7:00 PM. Every day at that time, my good friend Chen Jian and I hung out near the delegates’ hotel. We handed them photocopies of the article.” Tong convinced several NPC delegates to take up his proposal in April 1991, but it was too late for inclusion in that year’s agenda. It appeared on the official agenda in 1992, and several times thereafter. But the results were always the same: “The issue has been studied. It is unsuitable for further action.” That sums up the PRC’s attitude toward the issue.


152. The late Frits Kalshoven of Leiden University is perhaps the most notable exponent of this position. See Kalshoven, supra note 107, at 831. Professor Kalshoven testified on the issue of individual rights to compensation in a lawsuit brought by Filipina comfort women against Japan. See Transcript of Oral Judgment Delivered by the Judges of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery (Dec 4, 2001), http://iccwomen.org/wigjdraft1/Archives/oldWCGJ/tokyo/summary.html [https://perma.cc/YU6A-UAUU].


154. *Id.* (translated by author).

155. *Id.*
Unable to convince the NPC, Tong focused his efforts on mobilizing public opinion. While working at a research center on aging, Tong founded an organization to press Japan for compensation.\footnote{156. Zhang Lei, Public Sacrifice Day: The Chinese People Send a Letter to the Japanese Government for the First Time to Apologize for the Nanjing Massacre, CHINA YOUTH DAILY (Dec. 8, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/CrmpUBOERvyYM_UNtTdYLw [https://perma.cc/WDV5-7TV5].} The organization undertook many initiatives to promote reparations, including gathering signatures for a demand that Japan pay U.S. $180 billion for the “deaths, injuries, destruction of personal property, forced labor, ravaging women, for conducting biological experiments on Chinese and stealing antiquities.”\footnote{157. See John Kohut, The Bitter Legacy of Hatred, WASH. POST., May 10, 1992.} The organization also wrote petitions for individual war victims, which Tong delivered personally to the Japanese embassy in Beijing.\footnote{158. Chinese ‘Comfort Women’ Demand Apology, Compensation, KYODO NEWS, Aug. 7, 1992.} He established links with reparations groups in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea.\footnote{159. 300,000 Chinese Demand War Reparations, AGENCIE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 15, 1992.} He convened academic conferences to discuss war reparations.\footnote{160. Scholars Gather to Discuss War Reparations, KYODO NEWS, Sept. 18, 1992.} Tong played an important coordinating role between individual war victims and the Japanese lawyers who represented them.\footnote{161. Robert Benjamin, China Seeks Business, Not Reparations, as Visit by Japanese Emperor Nears, BALT. SUN (Oct. 19, 1992, 12:00 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1992-10-19-1992293121-story.html [https://perma.cc/9M8L-LUPW] (noting Tong threatened to sue a Japanese company that used Chinese forced labor). Chinese courts only accepted wartime reparations claims in 2014. So discussions of court challenge in 1992 were premature by a couple of decades.} Tong had established himself as a major broker in the war reparations movement; thousands of Chinese citizens had written him letters, or visited him in Beijing, to enlist his support.\footnote{162. Id.} When a group of Japanese human rights lawyers, including Attorney Onodera Toshitaka, visited China in July, 1994, Tong identified a number of potential plaintiffs.\footnote{163. Lei, supra note 149.} For the next decade, Onodera and Tong would work together to facilitate transnational litigation by Chinese forced laborers, comfort women, and other civilian casualties in Japanese courts.\footnote{164. Id.}
E. Guan Jianqiang 管建强 (China) (1956 Present)

Guan is China’s leading legal authority on World War II reparations. He has published not only several works on general international law and military law, but also three widely referenced texts specifically on war reparations litigation. Alongside Tong Zeng, and attorney Kang Jian, Guan has consistently advocated for the rights of Chinese victims to seek compensation from the Japanese State and corporations.

In addition to his scholarly work, Guan has also testified in Japan one of few Chinese scholars to do so. In the Unit 731/chemical weapons lawsuit, Guan submitted expert testimony (kantei ikensho), and testified in person before the Tokyo High Court on December 7, 2004. He argued that the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué only waived the Chinese government’s right to demand compensation, but not the individual’s right to demand compensation. As a matter of both text (plain reading of the instrument), and procedure (China’s NPC did not


167. Wang Jinti v. Japan, Tôkyô Kôtô Saibansho [Tokyo H. Ct.] July 19, 2005. The thrust of the lawsuit was that Japan, by using chemical weapons developed in their Unit 731 military facility against Chinese civilians, violated Chinese law, Japanese law, customary international law, and international treaty law. But Japanese courts have rejected such claims as barred by statute of limitations, or waived by postwar treaties (between Japan and China, Japan and South Korea, etc.).


169. See Guan Jianqiang (管建强), 「日中共同声明」等の対日戦争賠償請求権問題について [Concerning the War Reparations Claims Against Japan in the “Joint Communiqué” and Other Instruments], http://www.anti731saikensen.net/saiban/2shin/kanteiiken/kan.html [https://perma.cc/5LAJ-S3NP].
ratify the instrument), he argued, the individual retained the right to seek compensation.170

Guan has also advocated for Chinese victims to sue Japanese corporations in China, a position that Chinese courts have (with one exception171) not accepted.172 According to Guan, resort to Chinese courts will not only help the victims, but also maintain the prestige of the Chinese government, which has played a very limited role in the war reparations debate.173 Guan used his affiliation at East China University of Law and Political Science to set up a fund to raise money for Chinese wartime forced laborers.174

IV. Conclusion

The rise of war reparations litigation in East Asia owes much to a group of dedicated lawyers in Japan, and their transnational networks in Taiwan, China and Korea. At the same time, academics have supported this socio-legal movement through research, advocacy, and expert testimony in court hearings. One might say that two academics based in Japan launched the war reparations movement in the 1970s, when Professors Miyazaki and Ong formed the Consideration Committee; the Committee supported and guided the Taiwanese veterans’ lawsuit from 1977 to 1992.

170. joint communiqué of the govt of japan & the govt of china, sept. 29, 1972, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html [https://perma.cc/5R2Q-AD5D]; see also lena h. sung, japanese invest in manchuria, but face mistrust from wartime occupation, wash. post. (July 8, 1992), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/07/08/japanese-invest-in-manchuria-but-face-mistrust-from-wartime-occupation/63033d2c-4872-4826-b5d9-6b5d710584d1/ [https://perma.cc/6U6Q-CQ89]. Article 5 of the joint communiqué provides that “the government of the people’s republic of china . . . renounces its demand for war reparation from japan.” In 1993, Chinese foreign minister qian qichen made clear that only the government not individual Chinese citizens waived the claim to seek compensation.


173. see id.

174. id.
From that time forward, other academics grew interested in war reparations based on their various life experiences: Utsumi Aiko as a social historian teaching in Indonesia, Tanaka Hiroshi as a Sinologist hearing about Chinese forced labor in the news, Onuma Yasuaki as an international lawyer questioning received wisdom from the Tokyo Tribunal, and Tong Zeng as a graduate student in international law. Once interested in a particular issue, academics often support other facets of the movement. For example, Onuma’s interest in the postwar Tokyo Tribunal led him to rethink Japan’s own role in the war, and more particularly about the damage done to Asian people, including Koreans on Sakhalin, and “comfort women.”  


177. Id. at 9–10.