This Note argues that Connecticut’s eligibility criteria is inconsistent with the best practices set forth by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD). In assessing intellectual disability, the AAIDD dispels of strict IQ cutoff scores and instead engages in a holistic inquiry emphasizing the individual’s overall well-being. This Note calls upon the Connecticut legislature to enact a statutory amendment that will modernize Connecticut’s eligibility practices, and ensure that Connecticut is meeting its imperative of providing assistance to those most in need.

The author argues that embezzlement, as codified in 18 U.S.C. § 641, should never be considered a continuing offense. The plain language of the statute does not label embezzlement a continuing offense. Furthermore, the Toussie v. United States decision, which created the modern test for whether a crime is a continuing offense, supports a narrow interpretation of the doctrine. The test for whether a crime is a continuing offense turns on the nature of a crime, not the manner in which it is committed in a specific case. Therefore, embezzlement cannot become a continuing offense when the particular mechanism used in the theft is automated. Rather, the continuing offense exception should not apply to embezzlement because embezzlement is closely related to larceny, an instantaneous offense. In addition, a narrow application of the continuing offense doctrine reduces the chance of unfair trials and limits the potential abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Instead of expanding the continuing offense doctrine, the judiciary should adhere to the legislature’s decision to provide a five-year cutoff date for prosecutions of embezzlement.

The author takes the proposition presented in Cushman and seeks to expand it to another scheme that provides disability benefits to service members still in the military. The Department of Defense may separate with severance pay or medically retire a member who suffers from a medical condition which renders him or her unfit for further military duty. The military disability benefits available to members under this scheme lack any judicially recognized constitutional protection—despite many shared characteristics with disability compensation provided to veterans. The unspoken doctrine of judicial non-interference with national defense and military matters—the military deference doctrine— has stymied opinions like Cushman from appearing in the military disability benefits context. The author argues this doctrine does not apply where the military is acting as an administrator of benefits instead of providing for the national defense. Classifying military disability benefits as property interests does not imply national security issues. Rather, it recognizes that the government cannot arbitrarily deprive service members of disability benefits. The end sought by the Cushman analogy is as simple as the proposition the case stands for: disabled service members ought to be guaranteed a fundamentally fair adjudication—no matter the circumstances.

This Note argues that when the government forces Americans to perceive emotionally manipulative messages the resulting infringement on freedom of thought violates the First Amendment. It further demonstrates that, even in the cases of graphic labels and mandatory sonograms, there is inadequate First Amendment protection for the person compelled to perceive the message. Thus, this Note proposes a test with which courts could determine when the government’s non-rational compelled message must be limited in order to safeguard personal First Amendment rights. Such messages trample autonomy, derogate dignity, cast aside freedom of thought and belief, and are thus completely anathema to First Amendment principles. As such, courts must recognize a First Amendment right against non-rational government compelled perception.

The author focuses her analysis on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and argues that Massachusetts’s courts should deem parents’ health and well-being a relevant factor in determining whether parents are able to provide adequate care for their morbidly obese children. The prior four courts’ inclusion of parents’ health and wellbeing, including their own morbid obesity, is wholly relevant to the best interests of the child and is the appropriate standard for Massachusetts’s courts to follow. This Note analogizes Massachusetts’s consideration of parental fitness as a factor in a case involving an incarcerated parent with the issue of considering parents’ health and well-being as a factor in cases involving childhood morbid obesity. It also compares the best interests of the child standard used in adoption cases with the instant issue.

After exploring the background and philosophy of homestead laws nationally, this Article explores the problems with the old Massachusetts Act, followed by a detailed analysis of the new Act to examine how the problems were addressed. The authors conclude that although the new Massachusetts Homestead Act better accomplishes the intent of a homestead law, some of the language chosen by the Massachusetts legislature will continue to cause interpretation problems that may produce inconsistent results and new frustrations.

The Supreme Court’s physical presence requirement is the current standard, and it was never expressly limited by the Court to certain classes of state taxes. The author argues that the Supreme Court should articulate a bright-line rule requiring actual physical presence within a state before the state has the power to impose any tax on an entity. Given Congress’s refusal to act, and the landscape of uncertainty currently faced by many multi-state businesses, it is time the Supreme Court clears up the tangled underbrush with a bright-line standard.

In a civil action where the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction, the selection of a state or federal court may determine the success of the motion for temporary relief. The reason is simple: state and federal courts frequently apply differing standards to such preliminary motions. Massachusetts state and federal courts apply different standards, although some courts have indicated to the contrary. In the federal courts, the matter of differing standards is compounded by the complex Erie/Hanna doctrine. State courts may be similarly bound by the much less well known "reverse-Erie" doctrine. Consequently, the Massachusetts federal and state courts may be required to apply state standards to state claims and federal standards to federal claims.

This Article explores the standards for preliminary injunctions in Massachusetts state and federal courts, and the intricacies that attend their application. Part I provides background for the examination of state and federal standards. Part II addresses the criteria for temporary relief in the Massachusetts state courts, while Part III reviews the comparable standards in the Massachusetts federal courts. Part IV inquires into the Erie/Hanna doctrine as it applies to preliminary relief in the federal courts. The Article concludes with the author's observations about the issues raised.